Well, that didn’t last long. Cardiff City’s winning streak was restricted to just the one game as the Bluebirds fell to a heavy defeat at Anfield.
It was never going to be easy. Liverpool hadn’t conceded a goal at Anfield since February – over 918 minutes of football without conceding. Jurgen Klopp’s side are already being touted as title challengers and indeed their win over Neil Warnock’s men took the Reds to the top of the table.
What did we learn from the loss to Liverpool? Where did Neil Warnock get it wrong? Read on for this, plus more, in the VFTN Analysis of Liverpool 4-1 Cardiff City.
Have you caught up with Terry Phillips’ Match Report and Player Ratings?
Systems
After a run of playing a 4-5-1/4-3-3 hybrid system, Neil Warnock tinkered for the trip to Anfield. The loss of Harry Arter to injury, coupled with Joe Ralls’ suspension, meant that City were light in the centre of the park.
In came Junior Hoilett, taking Bobby Decordova-Reid’s place on the right-wing, who moved centrally behind striker Callum Paterson. That move meant that Cardiff city lined up in a 4-2-3-1 system.
#LIVCAR team news!
Brought to you by @1xbet_Eng…#CityAsOne ?⚽️?⚽️ pic.twitter.com/yOmjnrb7bK
— Cardiff City FC (@CardiffCityFC) October 27, 2018
Liverpool also made changes, three in total, and lined up in a similar formation. For the second game in a row, Klopp fielded a double pivot in the #6 position, with Gini Wijnaldum and Fabinho the midfield pairing. Adam Lallana played as the central attacking midfielder, with Mohamed Salah and Sadio Mane joining the Englishman behind false 9 Robert Firmino.
Today’s #LIVCAR team news ?
Three changes for #LFC; Lovren, Moreno and Lallana replace Gomez, Robertson and Shaqiri. https://t.co/Ehw6pqkgej
— Liverpool FC (@LFC) October 27, 2018
What the stats say
Yikes. Those stats aren’t pretty reading. Cardiff City were simply outclassed in every department.
While it would be largely expected, there are a couple of stats that don’t read well for City. If Cardiff are going to be successful in these types of games, they have to dominate the aerial battles. They were unable to win the majority of aerial battles, with Liverpool coming out on top with 18 battles won.
That stat perhaps suggests Cardiff’s biggest struggle during the game, the inability to get out of their own third. More on that to come.
Cardiff were unable to break out
Listen, Cardiff were always going to be up against it against Liverpool. Almost every single side in the league is when they visit Anfield. For Cardiff to threaten Liverpool, they had to be able to transition from a deep defensive block to a counter attack quickly.
In the example above, Cardiff have attempted to clear their lines by playing a ball up towards the forward players. The ball is lost and Liverpool put pressure on Cardiff once again.
The problem is clear; Cardiff are simply outnumbered. The other problem is that three of Cardiff’s front four are slight players. Bobby Decordova-Reid has no change in the air against Fabinho, while even Callum Paterson struggled up against Virgil Van Dijk and Dejan Lovren.
Paterson did win seven aerial duels, Van Dijk won nine and Lovren six.
All of this meant that Cardiff were simply unable to make that transition from defence to attack. The pressure on our back line was relentless and meant Cardiff were unable to put significant pressure on Liverpool.
Cardiff fall victim to Liverpool’s press
Liverpool and Jurgen Klopp are famous for their pressing – or gegenpressing as it has come to be known. Klopp prides his side on the ability to win the ball up high and sustain pressure on the opposition defence.
Cardiff fell victim to this on a number of occasions on Saturday.
What was perhaps most surprising from the Bluebirds was the inability to clear their lines. Neil Warnock sets his sides up – much to the dismay of so called football experts – to have the ball in the oppositions final third as much as possible. This means that Cardiff’s defenders and midfielders are told not to play around with it, but instead clear the ball long and put the pressure on the opposition.
There were plenty of times on Saturday when this was not the case. Cardiff’s back line failed to clear the ball on a number of occasions – either fluffing their lines or taking too long on the ball. This meant that they fell victim to Liverpool’s relentless press.
Above, Sol Bamba fails to clear his lines and there is a lack of communication between Bamba, Sean Morrison and Victor Camarasa. This allows Liverpool to win the ball up high and attack the Cardiff goal. This eventually led to the Reds’ first goal.
Cardiff were unable to handle Liverpool’s movement
One of Liverpool’s biggest strengths is their movement off the ball. Their players are fluid, which means that they often either lose their marker or create space for another man to run into.
This was particularly dangerous against a Cardiff side that like to operate in a man-to-man full pitch marking system. Roberto Firmino is the epitome of Liverpool’s movement, dropping deep from his striking position and leaving space for another player to penetrate.
This gave Sol Bamba and Sean Morrison a dilemma; do they follow their man or do they let him run free? Often, they didn’t know which was the better option.
In the example above, Liverpool’s movement means that they have a number of players in a lot of space. Adam Lallana and Trent Alexander-Arnold have both run beyond the front players and find themselves in Cardiff’s box. These two players occupy five players; including Aron Gunnarsson.
The Icelandic captain has done the right thing, following his runner, but what this means is that both he and the defence are both picking up the same player and those Liverpool forwards that have dropped deep are in lots of space.
Roberto Firmino, Liverpool’s number 9, is sat behind Fabinho, the defensive midfielder, which tells you all you need to know about their fluid movement.
Did Warnock get the system wrong?
I’ve been slightly critical of Warnock’s choice of systems against the big teams so far this season and I’m afraid I’m going to be slightly critical of it here, too.
Above, I touched on the movement and how Liverpool used it to pull Cardiff’s players out of position and find space. Due to Liverpool’s superior quality, one player could often occupy two of Cardiff’s players, meaning there was extra space.
I think Warnock’s biggest problem was re-introducing the #10 position. There’s two reasons for this.
- Defensively it left Cardiff vulnerable, with more space for Liverpool to penetrate. The big problem area was between Cardiff’s two centre backs and two central midfielders. Without a proper defensive midfielder, and with lots of Liverpool runners, this was the space where Liverpool caused trouble.
By dropping the number ten role deeper, it would’ve allowed Warnock to deploy a defensive midfielder to patrol that space. It would’ve given Liverpool an extra-player to work against and, while there’s a chance they would’ve done it, Warnock would’ve made Cardiff harder to beat. 
2. The other problem it caused was that Bobby Reid was often left in no man’s land. As shown in the diagram below, Reid was left isolated and Liverpool had plenty of men able to shut down his space should he try to find some. They were also able to cut out all of his passing lanes, meaning that, through no fault of his own, Bobby Decordova-Reid was largely ineffective.
Conclusion
Liverpool were always likely to come out top in this one, it’s important to remember that. They spent more on a goalkeeper this summer than Cardiff did on their entire squad.
Ultimately, though, the decision not to play a proper defensive midfielder could’ve cost Cardiff any chance of success in this game. That vacant space allowed Liverpool’s movement to cause City problems and increase the pressure on Cardiff’s defence.